/25 cont./

793 and to receive the title of Cheikh, with the advantages which
* 795 that confers. While waiting, he works at hoeing and clearing
244 land without counting or measuring all the lands capable of pro-
[555] ducing the groundnuts which make up the fortune of his mara-
bout.

It is this way of colonizing the lands, and more particularly the new lands, which has made the brotherhood play an important role in the economy of Senegal in recent years. The Murid marabouts have been and remain clearers /26/ of land and large-
[433] scale producers of groundnuts. It can be estimated that they alone produce a little more than half of the total harvest of the Territory.

793 This brilliant picture is nevertheless not without shadows.
* 795 Even though the influence of the Murid leaders is not dangerous
● 578 on the political level as a consequence of the good understanding which exists between them and the Administration, even though there is no reason to fear that they may incite the members of the brotherhood to insubordination, their presence in the villages does pose problems. There are problems when they have settled in villages whose chiefs are not Murids (if not, sometimes, anti-Murid). In these cases it often happens that there are collisions
[627] between the customary chiefs and the Murid marabouts, principally since the reforms of 1945 which diminished considerably the powers of the chiefs and their prestige in the eyes of the people at a time when the influence and glory of the marabouts were increasing. Many times the Murids of a canton want to obey
[632] only their religious leader and willfully ignore the canton chief. In addition, in the face of the invading agricultural activity of the Murids, the non-Murid populations stiffen themselves more and more and try to resist their agrarian encroachments. That sometimes creates quarrels; indeed it even provokes violent disorders which have to be arbitrated or stopped.

793 On the other hand, the recent political evolution which is
* 795 resulting in giving the right to vote to all Senegalese men and
666 all Senegalese women has prompted the politicians to seek the collaboration and friendship of the Murid leaders... so that they

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37
Wolof MS30

caste from his own tribe. The extent to which caste matters is brought out by the case of a young Catholic girl from a devout family who, rather than marry a fellow Catholic out of caste, in the end became the polygamous wife of a Muslim of the same caste. Within any ethnic group in Senegal marriage out of caste is extremely rare.

The caste system is not vicious in any real sense. For the privileges of a high caste entail many obligations. Thus a noble Wolof family will be obliged to feed and pay frequent sums of money to its family griots (minstrels, praise-singers and family historians) and if they fail to do this the griot is able to shame them publicly as a poor or mean family, something a Wolof would avoid at all costs. Likewise the artisan castes have a monopoly in their respective trades, since it would be impossible for a noble or free man to undertake the work of a jeweller or smith. Nevertheless in Senegalese society the term 'bijoutier' or 'tisserand' has slight contempt attached to it. The only caste to suffer socially in any way is of course that designated slave, because of the implications of such a status. In social investigations amongst the factory workers of Dakar, M. André Hauser found very few indeed who would admit to being of slave caste.

At present it is certainly a disadvantage to belong to any of the inferior castes, and though one hears of a few cases of open clashes between castes, in the present state of affairs it is certain that a number of young men resent this classification of people into superior and inferior groups and it is very much less important to them than to the older generation.

Early in 1961 *Agence Presse Sénégalaise* reported 'bloody clashes between griots and non-griots at Diack'. These ended with several dead and a number of wounded and started as a result of the refusal of non-griots to accept the burial of griots in their burial ground. The Minister of the Interior himself went to settle the dispute and gathered the whole population to tell them that his Government gave

5: Crowder, J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

equal status to all Senegalese and wanted to make everyone true Senegalese citizens whether they were griots, leather-workers or jewellers. Afterwards the non-griots agreed that the griots who had just died should be buried in the same way as anyone else, and as a beginning they agreed to let the burial of the victim of the incident take place, not in the traditional baobab but in Diack earth.'

In the Government today there are, amongst those members belonging to tribes with a class system only two of inferior caste, one being a 'bijoutier' and one a griot. It is said of another that he is of slave origin, but this is not certain because politicians often try to attribute inferior caste to their opponents. In the Assembly, of the members with caste all are noble or freeborn with the exception of one 'bijoutier', and one griot. It is thus at present difficult to get on in politics unless one is noble or freeborn. Indeed chiefly connexion is important, even though chiefs are no longer of significance administratively. Thus in 1957 Kenneth Robinson wrote:

> Membership of chiefly families is, nevertheless, an important source not only of prestige but of political interest. In many interviews with political leaders in the smaller townships and villages they almost invariably defined their own position, and that of their fellows, in part by reference to their relationship with the ruling families, or with the indigenous caste system.

Mr. William Foltz, who is making a detailed survey of Senegalese politics, has however observed that the local party groups in the country are increasingly representative of the inferior castes and many of the important backroom boys are of inferior caste, which suggests that there may be a change from the present situation at the next elections. But so far, as Mercier has observed, it does not look as though high standing in the modern context can yet completely redeem traditional inferiority.

The caste system in Senegal is one of the most delicate problems confronting the Senegalese Government today.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

EVOLUTION OF SENEGALESE ELITES

P. MERCIER

The increasingly rapid development of elites[1] of a non-traditional type is a conspicuous feature of the social change now occurring in all African territories. It is a sign of the most recent phase of the crisis through which colonized societies are passing. The problems connected with the crystallization[2] of such elites vary considerably in different regions and in different economic, political and social contexts. Even inside the group of territories composing French West Africa appreciable local variations can be observed. But everywhere these elites exert ever stronger and more united pressure on existing politico-social organizations in the hope of attaining to the leadership they feel to be their destiny. Wherever we study them, we find the same situation—fraught with conflict: conflict with the existing African social system imposed by colonization; conflict with the traditional ruling classes or what remains of them; internal conflict, when the elites do not—as yet, at any rate—form a homogeneous group, or, alternatively, when divergent trends appear. The same phenomena can be found everywhere, and go to make up a general pattern.

If, however, we wish to understand the discrepancies observed in the pace at which the new elites developed, their composition, their methods and capacity for self-expression, their ambitions, etc., we must study the differences between them. Among the criteria applicable in a first attempt to classify the various regional situations, the following appear to me to be the most important:

1. Extension of education. We have to take into account both a territory's crude school rate and, among other facts: any divergencies between the rates reached by different regions of the same territory; inequalities in the distribution of school facilities on racial, religious or other grounds, the distribution of the school population classified according to the various kinds and degrees of education, the distribution of the school population classified by sex, etc.
2. Types and degree of economic development, i.e. whether or not it has permitted the emergence of social categories well-integrated in modern economic life, and, in particular, with the capacity for investing money: rich farmers (mainly planters), merchants, entrepreneurs, etc.;[3] whether or not an embryonic working class has emerged in urban centres (an elite of manual workers more or less closely linked to the intellectual elite and anxious to assume leadership of a pseudo-proletariat[4] of casual labourers).[5]
3. Role of the traditional structures and social grades. The traditional political, religious and other systems have more or less succeeded in holding their own and the governing classes which made them work have been able to

1. The word 'elite' is used here in a very broad sense. It does not mean a ruling class, but a social category more or less enjoying prestige status and exerting influence, by its example, over the whole or large sections of the population.
2. Crystallization which does not necessarily result in the formation of well-knit groups.
3. The Ivory Coast offers the most typical example of such development.
4. In most cases, it maintains close ties with the district or the group from which it comes.
5. The classic example is that of the Senegalese towns.

6: Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

The reason is not to be sought solely in the increase in numbers of this intellectual elite though that was quite substantial. Trained in Europe and remaining in touch with the world outside, it was the first section of the population to become consciously aware of the 'colonial situation',[1] and it immediately made an attempt to build up ideological systems which soon acquired crucial influence. Next, the changed pattern in the relations between Europeans and Africans speeded up the development of situations in which conflicts became inevitable, and encouraged the maintenance of close contact between the new and the colonial elites. I shall revert to this point later. True, tension existed, especially between generations, the older strata of the colonial elite having sometimes to defend the positions they had won.[2] But the younger people tended to identify themselves with the new elite, to accept its guidance and to share, more or less confusedly, in the same awakening to the colonial situation. Thus, the intellectual elite, in the broadest sense of the term, embarked in a new direction, and the political consequences of this change are now beginning to be seen. The problem of relations with the workers' elite which has emerged in the past few years is more complex; I shall come back to it in connexion with trade union activity.

In the typical pre-war situation, the African elite had little chance of competing with the European managing class, which was much less numerous that it is now.[3] It was trained to be what might be called an auxiliary elite. The new elite, on the contrary—notwithstanding the administrative and economic expansion of the past 10 years—will inevitably find itself in competition with Europeans in the managing and supervisory grades in an ever growing number of specific cases. Though still few in numbers, it has difficulty in finding a place in the territory's administrative and technological machine. It is a paradox that in a country immensely in need of responsible personnel, both managers and technicians, demand seems somewhat to exceed supply. In French West Africa, and particularly in Senegal, the government officially recognizes the existence of an 'employment problem for holders of diplomas'. One of the causes of this situation is no doubt the total absence of planning in the training of elites.[4] But the real explanation must be found in political circumstances and race relations.[5] The effort to 'Africanize' the upper grades encounters firm resistance, and so the rise of the elites is apparently seriously checked by the growing number of situations in which Africans and Europeans compete and which the two groups explain in diametrically opposite ways.[6] It is a significant fact that several Senegalese who have completed their studies in France have remained there, because they would be unable to find jobs for which they could apply at home. The problem is obviously even more acute in the private sector than in the administration.[7] Also, the European population has considerably increased in the past 10 years:[8] it has more than doubled in Senegal, tripled at Dakar—where it now represents about 10 per cent of the population.

1. Cf. the studies of G. Balandier, and in particular: *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique Noire* (Present sociology of Negro Africa), Paris, 1955.
2. Especially in the administration.
3. Cf. P. Mercier, 'Le Groupement Européen de Dakar: Orientations d'une Enquête' (The European group at Dakar: Suggested line for a survey), *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, XIX, 1955.
4. An effort is now being made in this direction.
5. Cf. P. Mercier, 'Le Groupement Européen de Dakar . .', op. cit.
6. Patterns of thought based on the pre-war situation play a fundamental role here.
7. Where the trend, as yet timid, towards 'Africanization' of the upper grades can be discerned.
8. A general phenomenon in French West Africa which involves important changes in relations between Africans and Europeans.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

cent of the population. Thus, the number of Europeans in intermediate or subordinate posts has substantially increased and the range of competitive situations, instead of growing less is being regularly extended. This affects not only the new elite, but a large segment of the old 'administrative bourgeoisie', and even, to some extent, the workers and lower supervisory grades in industry. And so, while—in theory—opportunities for reaching the highest ranks and simultaneously entering the European group (a consequence foreseen by assimilationist ideology) have increased with the development of education, in reality a radical change in the whole social structure has multiplied the causes of conflict. New factors have cropped up abruptly: further assimilation is gainsaid, Europeans and Africans become more and more sensitive to the realities of race, etc. Obviously, the political consequences of such conflicts are considerable.

I have mentioned cases in which a rift occurred between the elites and the masses, in the early years, at any rate, of the 'colonial elite'. This fact needs some further explanation, while the question of the relations between the 'educated' and the 'traditional' categories calls for re-examination on a wider basis. The stereotyped patterns maintained by the European administration underline the points of divergence. The administration has besides had a tendency—and not only in Senegal—to underestimate the influence of modernist elites and to depreciate their impact upon the population as a whole. True, important tensions can be observed, and some antagonism developed between the citizens (those of the 'four communes'), from whom the major part of the 'colonial élite' came, and the subjects in the other parts of the territory; but such tensions virtually disappeared with the legal changes introduced immediately after the war, a fact which is proof enough how superficial the points of divergence were. The 'educated' classes, moreover, sought to reap all possible profit from the power they acquired in their administrative functions, or in their role of intermediary between producers and the big commercial companies; and that attitude naturally set up a great many local conflicts. Sometimes they sought compensation for their inferior standing in the traditional framework by asserting themselves in the exercise of their new functions. As we have already shown, however, the population as a whole recognized the prestige of the new intellectual elite. True, their prestige did not necessarily displace the traditional prestige, but the two can coexist, a circumstance which stands out most clearly in rural districts. So, even if the 'educated' African has difficulty in fitting into the traditional system or even the family group, even if he is often a maladjusted element, he is rarely the fish out of water whom so many colonial observers considered him. All the elements of the population are still continually in touch.[1] There are two basic reasons for this. First, the range of family relationships is still a very wide one and they themselves are still effective; they maintain their hold on the 'educated' African even when he has left his birthplace. Secondly, religion—chiefly Islam in Senegal—and above all, membership of a sect, which is practically hereditary, continue to be important. The fact that tension between elites and masses led to nothing but quite limited and temporary breaks explains why the recent and entirely conscious effort to retie loose bonds was carried through with comparative ease. It was the new elite that, with political aims in view, inspired this effort. Usually too far removed from the

1. The vitality of racial or religious associations is significant in this respect.

6:Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

only a limited, and very indirect, part. Between this group and the working-class elite certain persisting tensions can be descried; a survey among the younger members—students, young workers—has brought to light more or less radical divergencies. However, the new elite is trying to extend its activity to the trade union sphere. A confederation of African workers independent of the organizations in metropolitan France has recently been founded, in which the young intellectual elite will apparently be extremely influential. This would be the counterpart of its entry into organized political action. In another domain, significant changes are occurring: the 'cultural associations' have a much more important role than their name would imply.[1] These are made up of the intellectual elite (in the widest sense in which I have used this term), which seeks by these means to avoid being relegated to a position of isolation, to acquire greater influence in the education of the people—e.g. through theatrical representations in one of the local languages—and to rediscover the highways of traditional African culture.

It is the new elite that has given expression to this desire for a 'return to the fountain-head'. A reaction, against assimilationist policies has appeared. From the acceptance of assimilation characteristic of he preceding generation opinion turned first to less sharply defined positions—typified by the slogan 'assimilate, don't be assimilated'—and then to attitudes of refusal, the details of which are still not very clear. Such attitudes accompany a lush ideological growth, to which only a very brief reference can be given here. It is not exempt from inconsistency; it is intertwined with growths of very different origin, sometimes hostile to each other. The only point at which all these ideologies concur is that they one and all are the expression of an intense reaction against colonialism—and obviously against the policy of assimilation—and serve as a basis for a growing 'nationalism'.[2] I will mention only the following points: the revival of African cultures and the affirmation of the common elements in a pan-African or, more generally, a Negro culture; the development of a veritable mythology around the notion of 'Negrohood'[3] and of a sort of 'counter-racism', the end-result of which is to shut the door on the outside world—i.e. primarily the Western world; the reinterpretation of history through a reversal of the perspective, a method applied not only to the history of the slave trade and the colonial period, but to the whole history of Africa as well;[4] the forging from Marxist theories of an ideological battering ram, to be used in a specifically African anti-colonial drive. The results of all these efforts make rapid headway throughout the 'educated' classes.[5]

The above picture is unavoidably only an incomplete outline. I have merely sought to bring out the importance of the present transitional phase and its characteristic processes. A new intellectual elite is taking up the torch from the 'colonial elite' which in Senegal had already succeeded in gaining appreciably greater influence than in the other French West African territories; there has been no break between them. And yet tensions and possibilities of conflict exist. Nevertheless, the conscious search for points of contact with

2. The study of political problems is a particularly important part of their activity.
3. In the African context, this term is used very broadly, to cover all anti-colonial movements.
4. The review *Présence Africaine* offers many examples of articles showing the influence of this idea.
5. The recent book by Cheikh Anta Diop, *Nations Nègres et Culture* (Negro nations and culture), Paris, 1955, is a highly significant example of what is being done on these lines.
6. There are still more trends, but they indicate a change of outlook which will probably become deeper with time.

6: Mercier E-5 (no date) 1956 MS37 Senegal MS37

178
571

the masses which are still partly traditionalists helps to strengthen the ties between the masses and the elite—ties never completely broken. General acceptance of the example set by the elite testifies at another level to the permanence of those ties (despite frequent conflicts, misunderstanding, and failures at adaptation). However, certain traditional factors making for heterogeneity still enter into the picture. Tensions can most easily degenerate into conflicts when relations between members of different racial groups, or different castes, are involved. That is a problem which cannot be studied in detail here. But [578] the survival of such rifts (other examples in Negro Africa show that they may reappear after being temporarily suppressed) is a basic fact. A long time will probably be needed before the obstacle they represent to the growth of a homogeneous elite wielding universal influence can be overcome in Senegal. But only when that has been done can the broad general trends briefly described above find their complete expression.

[p 452]

665 elements that have been urbanized the
369 longest, the percentage of party memberships has been as high among women as among men. This was a peculiar aspect of the Dakar situation, not found, for instance, at Thiès (where the percentage of memberships among women, depending upon the ethnic group, was from one-half to one-tenth that among men). At Dakar the women's branches on occasion could mobilize large crowds, adorned in party colors. Study of about 30 of these individual cases suggested that the conscious essence of political attachment consisted almost entirely of the relation with the leader.

665 The formalization noted above can be
• 578 studied from various points of view. The fundamental bipartition of political life in a way was responsible for the indirect expression of intragroup and intergroup divisions and rivalries whose nature was other than political. This explains why the line of separation between the two political blocs did not have the same significance to all sectors of the population. In specific situations it assumed many meanings. For example, one could find: (1) hostility between the Lebou-Wolof grouping and the rest of the population (which resembled, without exactly corresponding to, the fundamental division [563] noted above); (2) hostility, more or less muted, between Wolof and Lebou; and (3) hostilities within each of the two groups, in proportion to diversities of origin, status, etc.

This accounts for the relative flexibility prevailing in the composition of the clienteles that made up the parties.[89] Since the clienteles represented varied levels, however, they introduced new divisions, or revived and solidified old hostilities.

665 (1) A fundamental problem arises from the interactions between the modern political system and what remains of the traditional or semi-traditional sys-

[P.13A]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[39] We found, for example, that extended family groups with some degree of solidarity might be divided in political views. This caused severe tensions, but rarely breaks.

[40] *Cf.* C. Michel, *op. cit.* The civil administration continued to grant some prominence to the *sérigne* of Dakar, and ultimately used him as a propaganda agent in some of its activities outside Senegal.

[P. 13C]

665 [5]8[6]35

8:Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

665 spected figures, with the aim of keeping
[193] such matters on a purely religious plane, has had little success. The Tidjane chieftans have been too enmeshed in politics to listen.

527 (3) A last example involves recrea-
665 tional activities organized at the end of the year around the exhibition of the
● 578 "lanterns."[41] These activities provided a basis for the formation of temporary groupings founded on ethnic background, neighborhood, occupation, etc. Such groupings undertook the making of a "lantern," and exhibited it to neighbors, relatives and others, eventually by forming a parade. An element of competition entered; the most noteworthy "lanterns" won rather imposing gifts and a brief prestige for the groupings that exhibited them. The parties seized on this competitive aspect. Party sections themselves created "lantern" groupings. With access to considerable material means and a large number of workers, they made "lanterns" that were veritable carnival floats, huge and very elaborate. Their exhibition brought together in a procession the typical rabble of large political demonstrations. At the same time it aroused friction between hostile parties.[42] They had taken over, almost entirely at their expense, demonstrations whose character they had utterly changed. This is a typical example of the way in which disparate activities have been infused by the two-party rivalry.

369 This process also has another side: the
665 parties have seen a decline in their opportunities for expressing political drives. In the old cities, they experienced relative stagnation for some years, while social changes accelerated and intensified. Elements just becoming aware of the world

[P. 14A]

8: Mercier E-5 (ca. 1955) 1960 MS37 Senegal MS37

[41] At first these were merely decorated lanterns. The custom certainly has a European origin; it is typical of the "old cities" of Senegal.

[42] In 1914 the parades of "lanterns" were prohibited by administrative edict.

[43] The results at Dakar and at Thiès cannot be compared in detail. However, the informative value of these general results could, in each case, be verified at other stages in the research.

[44] It should be noted that in the case of Thiès the category of unskilled workers was much closer to that of semi-skilled workers. The unskilled workers, largely employed by the railroad, comprise a more stable group than at Dakar.

* [i.e an exhibition of "lanterns" at the end of the year accompanied by recreational activities — See category 116, P. 14A -- Analyst]

[P. 14C]

[578] [463] [Lui] [Less] 6 926 665

8:Mercier E-5 (ca.1955) 1960
MS37 Senegal MS37

467 those of the African unions.[50] The acute
468 crises produced by certain important
668 strikes gave forceful expression to this
563 rift. The African unions, despite their ideological differences, despite the personal rivalries that brought their leaders into opposition, often engaged in combined and coordinated activities. By contrast, the strikes of the African workers and those of the European workers scarcely ever coincided, though the latter might break out as a response to the [465] former in an effort to maintain the hierarchy of salary scales. As demonstrations of African unity against the civil administration and against European ● [578] controls in general, strikes were the only occasion in which the underlying tension characterizing the city appeared distinctly and in a generalized fashion. It was because they expressed this tension that their impact and the emotional response to them were so important.

467 (3) This was also the principal cause
468 of their ultimate success. During such
668 conflicts, demands were expressed that were far more extreme than those made by the parties. Thus, in the strikes of 1953, the union press and the union leaders evoked the possibility that African "loyalism" would be suspended and that the bonds between France and the Overseas Territories would be changed; the question of independence was openly and threateningly discussed. Union activities assumed a certain nationalistic coloring that the parties at that time disregarded. Behind every limited demand regarding salaries or the regulation of working conditions lay the fundamental anti-colonial demand; it was this demand that gave weight to the mass demonstrations and that carried the day.[51] It must be further
467 noted that during this period major ex-
668 ternal ideological elements entered the contest, especially through the unions. An important number of their activists had studied techniques of organization,

[P. 18A]

[12 cont.]

369 178 [584] [581] [562] always temporary marriages, so great is the attachment of the Saint-Louis man for his city and for the girls of his city. Although this situation is very unfortunate for the boys, it is less so for the girls. Although some of them are still sacrificed very young to rich old men, many wait to meet the young man of their choice before marrying. The marriages of infant girls [582] have become very rare: the girls of Saint-Louis now marry at a reasonable age, at about 20, much like French girls. It is a profound change. Convinced of being obliged to wait a long 369 178 562 time for a husband, they are acquiring an independence that their mothers have not known; they go out, they go to dances where they dance European dances, they dare to sit at a table [191] in a café, they dress according to their taste, they speak French. They go to school without constraint, which is also a revolution, and they, like the boys, look for a salaried position, which allows them a very broad life, like single persons, and which, within the household, frees them from the guardianship of the [595] husband. Polygamy, which the modern [évoluées] women generally refuse, is more and more rare in Saint-Louis (4).

> 4. A polygamous husband most often shuns the modern women for the sake of peace in his household, because the personal earnings of these women permit them to buy finery other than that which he periodically distributes to his spouses, and this provokes jealousy and quarrels. Recently a young female official was supposed to enter the home of a Saint-Louis official as the third or fourth wife. She opposed her parents and married according to her inclination.

● [578]

Educated girls have long been judged quite harshly, but this is passing. Many of the young girls who married against the wishes of their parents have been quickly forgiven when the latter saw the good appearance of the household and the affluence

S /89 cont./
369 not left Africa for 30 or 40 years. Others, more favored by
563 business, take a trip each year to France or western Asia.
573 Generally, the children pursue their studies in their parents'
[484] land of origin and speak French and English fluently. This
[191] new generation of Levantines, to whom one must add a few
[529] Moroccans, is becoming integrated little by little in the
[578] metropolitan milieu through the medium of sports associa-
[477] tions and hunting parties. These amicable relations will perhaps favor to a certain degree a closer relationship between these groups which are so often antagonistic on the commercial level.

/90/

2. The Africans.

S According to the census statistics gathered in 1953, the
369 ethnic composition of the city was the following: out of an
563 African population of 36,050 inhabitants, the Wolof appeared
162 as the most numerous and, with 23,624 individuals, made
W up 65.5% of the population; the Toucouleur, numbering
[162] 3,356, represent 9.3% of the total; the Bambara (Sudanese,
[369] rather) attained third place and accounted for 6.8% of the population with 2,447 individuals; the Sérère, although settled in the vicinity of Thiès, included only 1,856 persons, namely, 5.1% of the total. The Peul and the Moors, respectively 1,074 and 843 individuals, made up 3% and 2.4% of the total. The Sarakolé and the various other groups, represented, respectively, by 650 and 2,190 members, formed 1.8% and 6.1% of the population.

W These details speak eloquently of the ethnic hetero-
[162] geneity of the Thiès population. Still, it should be empha-
[369] sized that the number of true Wolof is certainly less than the
[563] statistical figure given; after a stay of some ten years spent in Thiès, the Khassonké or the Sarakolé, who will have lost almost all contact with his country of origin, who will have married a woman not of his race, who will have adopted the language, the food, the corresponding Wolof name, will speak of himself as belonging to this group.

/91 cont./

369 563 [182] [565] [466] industrial enterprises and in the public function. Even in a professional category a certain hierarchy of a traditional order survives and is always respected. In the workshops of the Dakar-Niger, for example, the higher supervisory staffs are made up of workers belonging to superior castes: free men, descendants of chiefs' families... Operatives coming from families of griots or former captives, in spite of their skill at the work and their training, would have only very weak authority over their subordinates.

[578] The animosities between individuals belonging to formerly hostile groups or to opposed religious sects may sometimes reappear in the course of contacts between individuals or groups of individuals. Along the same line [466] of thought, a certain favoritism may creep into the relations between foreman and subordinates belonging to the same ethnic category or the same religion.

369 563 573 Within each ethnic minority scattered through the city spontaneous associations spring up, led by the oldest among them. These friendly groups meet periodically. They are at the bottom of the mutual aid to the newcomer, to the workman who lives temporarily without funds in the escale. Each of these gatherings is at the same time the occasion for "folkloristic" celebrations, reminding the members of the group of their customs and their country of origin.

369 177 563 The traditions which have been able to survive by being adapted to the new conditions of the society lose their importance to a certain extent in contact with new ideas and Western influence. We have already remarked that the notion of ethnic group is rapidly obliterated when the individual is transplanted for a long time in a city very far from his natal village. The family ties, and above all the [593] authority of the head of the family over each of its members, become extremely loose in the city. We see a breaking up of the subordination that subjected each of the members of a family to the paternal authority. The child is no longer compelled to adopt the trade of his father; he may choose the work that he thinks will suit him. The young girl is [584] rapidly becoming emancipated, and rare are the Thiès

/91 cont./

369 177 563 [584] [593] [182] families in which the father imposes on the child the spouse of his choice. The spread of the teaching of the Moslem and Christian religions count for much in this loosening of the too confining ties of family tradition. This breaking up of ancient, too narrow social structures is not a strictly /92/ urban phenomenon; it also occurs in the countryside, but with less force and with a certain delay.

369 565 178 The presence of the industrial bloc of the Dakar-Niger, on the other hand, has had as an effect the formation of a working class, which is a specifically urban phenomenon. Although the ancient system of castes does exist in human contacts, that of social class is little by little being substituted for it. In sum, there actually exists a superposition of the two systems, but the pre-eminence of the second is already being affirmed. Through daily contacts and the rapid [177] [467] [474] diffusion of social ideas coming from the West, the mass of workers is organized, it is grouped by syndicates, it has set up consumer co-operatives. Because of the great number of the members of this worker group, the workshops of the Dakar-Niger and, through repercussion, the city of Thiès itself have become the most active and the busiest centers of French West Africa. The strike that in 1948 paralyzed [468] railroad traffic on the two lines (Dakar-Bamako and Dakar--Saint-Louis) for several months is certainly proof of the influence of a powerful and organized grouping, and a typical urban phenomenon.

369 563 578 Thus there exists in Thiès a somewhat special social climate that sometimes makes the relations between Whites and Blacks strained. Chiefly during these periods of social crises. But these tensions are always temporary and automatically disappear as soon as the conflict is settled.

369 161 A much more important problem that seems general in all of the cities of Black Africa is that of the too rapid, if not excessive, swelling of the urban population. We have [162] seen that the population of Thiès has almost doubled from 1945 (24,000 inhabitants) to 1953 (40,000 inhabitants). Dakar, Conakry, and Abidjan have grown in the same proportions.